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X.—NOTE.
THE NOTION OF A GENERAL WILL.
IN a recent review of an article by Prof. Bosanquet I made some dis-
paraging observations about the General Will. It is one of the defects
of reviews that considerations of space compel a reviewer either to
confine himself to platitudes or to make assertions in a rather dogmatic
tone without offering adequate reasons or marking delicate shades of
difference. This fact, and certainly not any lack of respect for Prof.
Bosanquet, was the cause of some sentences which are perhaps wanting in
urbanity. I am quite sure that, when Prof. Bosanquet or Rousseau talk
of the general wUl, they must be referring to something real and im-
portant ; but I cannot detect anything that they might mean which seems
to me appropriately called by this name. And assertions are made about
this general will which seem incompatible with any meaning that I might
otherwise be inclined to attach to the phrase. Hence I can only conclude
that the name is a very unfortunate one, or else that there is something
highly important in human societies which may appropriately be termed
a will but which has wholly escaped my notice. It may just be worth
while for me to state shortly the difficulties that I feel about the whole
notion. They are so obvious and platitudinous that they cannot possibly
have escaped Prof. Bosanquet's attention, and therefore I am sure that
he must have some definition of the general will in his mind which is not
exposed to these objections. But I do not know what this may be, and
many other people of fair intelligence appear to bo in the same difficulty,
so that some further explanation from him seems highly desirable.
Let us begin by considering the will of a definite Englishman, Smith,
a stockbroker living in Brighton. I take it that we mean by Smith's will
the oomplex or system of Smith's particular volitions. He wants various
things at various times, and these wants and his efforts to satisfy them
are events with a certain place in his mental history. When we survey
them we find that a great number of them, at any rate, are connected
with each other in a rational way ; and this system of connected volitions,
or the organising principles of the system, are what I understand by
Smith's will. Now, when I talk of Smith's will, I am under no obligation
to regard him in abstraction from England, Brighton, and the stock-
exchange. I know quito well that each of his volitions depends upon
many conditions, that they would have been differently organised if he
had been born and brought up and hod lived in a different society or
had occupied a different position in his society. This I take to be
common ground. Hence, if you were to call Smith's actual will the
general will and confine the name Smith's will to the supposed system
of volitions that would have remained the same in whatever condition
Smith had been placed, it would lie a truism to say that Smith's will is
abstract and fragmentary compared with the general will. But this
would be a very odd way of speaking. It would be equally odd to call a
hypothetical will that Smith might have had under imaginary conditions
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Smith's will, and to call the will which Smitl actually has under the
actual conditions the general will. Nor would the general will, in this
sense, throw much light on the nature of a society of people of whom Smith
is only one member. Hence I conclude that this interpretation cannot
be Prof. Bosanquet's though it would account for some of his statements.
Having said what I understand by a man's will I will next consider in
what sonse it seems to me that a will can be called general. In the first
place you might say that Smith's will was general as compared with his
particular volitions. Any one of his particular volitions is certainly
fragmentary (and I think, in Prof. Bosanquet's sense, though not in the
sense in which I should use the word, abstract) as compared with his
will. But again this cannot be the fact that Prof. Bosanquet is referring
to, for he does not say that each man's volitions are fragmentary and
abstract as compared with that man's will, but that each man's will is
fragmentary and abstract as compared with the general will.
The second possible meaning of a general will refers to the wills of
several persons. Smith and Jones may be said to will the same thing
under certain circumstances. This does not of course mean that they
both want the same physical object, for their wills would then be in
opposition. The fact is of course that the phrase 'to want a certain
physical object' is elliptical; it means to want to possess this object. What
we will in every case is that a certain proposition or set of propositions
should be true. When we say that A and B have the same will we mean
that A and B both want some proposition or set of propositions p to be
true. If A and B do not have the same will one want:) p to be true and
the other wants q to be true. Two possibilities then arise : (i) p and q
may be incompatible, either for logical or physical reasons. Their wills
are then in opposition; (ii) p and q may be compatible. Their wills are
then mutually indifferent.
Now I suppose that there is a general will in a group of persons in so
far as they all will that a certain set of propositions shall be true. But,
if this be the right interpretation, I cannot un ierstand how anyone can
assert either (a) that the wills of various members of a group are frag-
mentary and abstract as compared with the general will, or (6) that the
general will is an adequate account of any state that is or has been.
(a) The general will is the will of each member that a certain set of
propositions shall be true. But each member also desires other pro-
positions to be true. The object of the general will is thus a fragment of
the object of any individual's will, if the gener.il will and the will of an
individual be interpreted as we have interpreted them. Prof. Bosanquet
holds that the exact opposite is the fact. There seems only one way in
which this could be justified. We might define Smith's private mil as
his desire for the truth of propositions other than those whose truth all
members of his community desire. With this definition Smith's will (as
already defined) = Smith's private will + the general will of Smith's
community. Now, whilst it is impossible that Smith's will should be
abstract and fragmentary as compared with the general will, it is possible
that Smith's private will might stand in this relation to the general will.
This would mean that the propositions which Smith desires to be true
and which some other members of his community do not desire to be true
are few or trivial as compared with those which all members of the
community desire to be true. It is to be noted that, if this should happen
to be a fact, it is not deductible from the generality of the general will or
the particularity of Smith's private will; it must be established by
independent observations. It might be true of A and not of B in the
community C; since it depends on the extent and importance of the
agreement between the members of C, and the number and importance of
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A's and B's private desires. I therefore cannot see that any general rule
could be laid down on the.subjeefe.
(6) I can make no elaim;*hatever to that practical acquaintance with
publio affairs which Prof.' Bosanquet has acquired by a long course of
disinterested social service. Nevertheless I must venture the opinion
that the general will in any state with which I am acquainted by observa-
tions or through history is abstract, negative, unenlightened, and dimly
conscious. If I were asked: 'What propositions do all or nearly afi
Englishmen desire to be true ?' I Bhould be puzzled to find many beside
the following: That everyone who will work shall have a certain
minimum of comfort, that the country should not be invaded nor its
government set at naught by those of other countries, that justice
(variously understood) shall be administered, and that there shall be tome
definite rules about the acquirement, distribution, tenure, and bequest of
property. Any attempt to particularise further about property would
neglect the important differences between what socialists and others
desire to be true; any attempt to particularise about the form of govern-
ment would neglect the difference between those who want parliamentary,
rule and those who prefer some form of syndicalism. That this amount
of agreement in what is willed by all is enough to constitute a state I
cannot for a moment believe. The real driving force of a state seems tc
me to be the will of a governing class; this will is sometimes good and
sometimes bad, but in normal times it gets itself obeyed unless it
flagrantly opposes the general will of all its subjects or of any large and
powerful section of them. The general will thus appears to me to be
merely a negative limiting condition within which infinite variations are
possible; and any complete theory of the state needs to explain these
variations by other principles.
0. D. BBOAO.
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